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NOTES
Administrative Law-The Legislative-Interpretative Distinction:
Semantical Feinting with an Exception to
Rulemaking Procedures
One of the major concerns of administrative law is the identifica-
tion of administrative action that requires prior notice and a public
hearing. Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act allows
exemption from such rulemaking procedures when the administrative
agency is promulgating an "interpretative" rule.1 While courts have
generally determined the applicability of this exemption by distinguish-
ing an action that is based on the administrator's interpretative power
from one that is based on his legislative power,2 this distinction may not
adequately protect the due process policies underlying the notice and
hearing requirement of administrative law.3 Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization v. Simon,4 in which a divided District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals held a Revenue Ruling interpretative on the
basis of the legislative-interpretative distinction, reveals that the efficacy
of the distinction may depend upon the manner in which it is judicially
applied and explores an alternative judicial approach for which there is
growing support.5
In 1956 the IRS issued Revenue Ruling' 56-1851 which required
hospitals to "accept patients in need of hospital care who cannot pay for
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-(c) (1970) provides:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published . . . . Mhis
subsection does not apply-(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice; or (B) when
.. notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest. (c) After notice required by this section, the
agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or with-
out opportunity for oral presentation.
2. See text accompanying notes 19-28 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 66-72 infra.
4. 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
5. See text accompanying notes 35-40 infra.
6. " A 'Revenue Ruling' is an official interpretation by the Service issued only
by the National Office and published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin for the informa-
tion and guidance of taxpayers, service personnel and others concerned." Rogovin, The
Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity, 43 TAXES 756, 764 (1965).
See also Rev. Proc. 28, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 496, 497.
7. Rev. Rul. 185, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 202.
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suoh services" in order to qualify for a charitable exemption.' This
requirement was eliminated by the IRS in 1969 through Revenue Ruling
69-545. 9 A group of health and welfare organizations and indigent
persons in Eastern Kentucky persuaded a federal district court to invali-
date Revenue Ruling 69-545 and enjoin its enforcement by the IRS.10
The appellate court, however, disagreed and in a two-to-one decision
refused to invalidate the ruling."1
The court resolved the question of the need for rulemaking proce-
dures on the basis of the legislative-interpretative distinction. Revenue
Ruling 69-545 was held to be an interpretative rule, a statement of the
administrator's opinion as to -the meaning of a statute or regulation, and
not a legislative rule which creates law by implementing the statutory
powers of the agency12 and is subject to section 553 proceedings. A
government admission -that the ruling had no binding effect and that the
court was free to review its substantive validity supported the view that
the rule had no force of law. The contradiction of the old ruling by the
new was found to be of no consequence since there was an intervening
Treasury Regulation 13 that adopted a broader concept of "charitable."
The Treasury Regulation had been adopted pursuant to notice and a
public hearing, and Ruling 69-545 conformed the definition of "charita-
ble -hospital" to that regulation.' 4
After concluding that the interpretative nature of the rule preclud-
ed the necessity for section 553 procedures and therefore permitted a
8. Section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, describes organiza-
tions exempt from income tax under section 501 (a) as groups "organized and operated
exclusively for . . . charitable ... purposes." Sections 170(a) through 170(c) allow
individual and corporate donors to deduct from their income tax contributions to
501 (c) (3) organizations.
9. Rev. Rul. 545, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 117.
10. 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973) (mem.). The district court held that the
ruling was invalid in that it was contrary to the legislative intent. The due process issues
of section 553 were not reached. Id. at 338.
11. 506 F.2d 1278. Plaintiff appellees' challenge to the rule on the basis of the
Administrative Procedure Act was an issue before the dourt only after resolution of the
government's challenges. The district court was upheld in rejecting claims of no
jurisdiction on the bases of sovereign immunity, the Anti-Injunction Act, and the
Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 1282-86. The court of appeals, however, reversed
the decision below on the grounds that the Revenue Ruling was consistent with
congressional decisions. Id. at 1286-90.
12. But cf. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7805.
13. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (d) (2) (1959).
14. 506 F.2d at 1290. Judge Wright, however, excepted to the majority basis for
calling the ruling interpretative. Since this ruling effects a "substantial change in the
availability of hospital services to the poor" and the IRS is not an "expert in health care
delivery needs," he determined that the purpose of section 553 called for notice and
hearing so that interested and affected parties could educate the agency. Id. at 1291-92.
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judicial judgment as to its propriety, 15 the court refused to hear evidence
from the parties in making that judgment. They reasoned that Ruling
69-545 contained two specific requirements substantially benefitting the
poor 6 and was consistent with the Treasury Regulation, and that the
changed status of health care in the country justified a new definition.'
These judicial facts satisfied a finding of no abuse of discretion in the
agency's determination.'"
The legal framework within which Eastern Kentucky' was decided
is provided by federal statute and cases decided thereunder. Section
553 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act requires notice and
hearing by an agency promulgating a rule that does not satisfy one of
the statutory exceptions. 19 Interpretative rules, one of these exceptions,
have been defined as statements of the administrative officer as to what
he thinks a statute means, and are distinguished from non-interpretative
or legislative rules which are based on a congressional delegation of
power to make regulations legislative in character.2"
Legislative rules derive a status of the force of law from their
authority, while interpretative rules are not binding on the courts.2 '
The force of law status limits the review of legislative rules to questions
of statutory authority, reasonableness, and procedure of adoption.22 By
holding the required hearings for these rules, the administrative agency
carries out the policy-making functions, and, because the function is
legislatively delegated, the courts are reluctant to interfere.23 Interpre-
tative rules, however, are viewed as nonauthoritative and the court is
free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the
regulation. It has been held that the factors the court will consider in
making this judgment are: (1) the thoroughness of the rule's considera-
15. Id. at 1290.
16. See generally note 54 infra.
17. The court reasoned that Medicare, Medicaid, and other government programs
have "greatly reduced the number of poor people requiring free or below cost hospital
services." Thus the rationale supporting Ruling 56-185 had disappeared. 506 F.2d at
1288-89.
18. Id. at 1291.
19. See note I supra.
20. Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States, 329 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1964); United States
v. 353 Cases, 247 F.2d 473, 480 (8th Cir. 1957); Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d
329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952); O'Neill v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 359, 363 (N.D. Ohio
1968).
21. American President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 316 F.2d 419,
421 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.03, at 298-99
(1958) [hereinafter cited as DAvis].
22. DAVIS, supra note 21, § 5.03, at 299.
23. Id. § 5.05, at 315.
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tion, (2) the validity of its reasoning, (3) its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and (4) all factors giving it power to per-
suade.24 These factors have not, however, been consistently applied.
Some cases have held that interpretative rules are subject to little judicial
scrutiny,25 while others have held that the reasonableness of the admin-
istrator's interpretation is to be tested closely. 20 Tax administrative
rules have not escaped these variations. Although Revenue Rulings are
generally held to be neither binding nor controlling as precedents,27
courts have also said that the "administrative interpretations of the IRS
• ..should be followed unless clearly inconsistent with the statute. '28
This inconsistency as to the authoritativeness of interpretative rules
probably results from -the variety and relative persuasiveness of factors
considered in judicial review of administrative rulemaking. 2  The ex-
pertise of the agency is one such factor. In highly technical areas the
agency's expert judgment will give the ruling a presumed validity or
decisive weight.30 Agency expertise has satisfied this standard in the
tax area,3' but judicial knowledge of tax law and policy will fre-
quently override this expertise. 2
24. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
25. Interpretative regulations have been held to have "the force and effect of law if
not contrary to statute." Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349 (1920).
They should "not be disturbed except for weighty reasons." Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S.
327, 336 (1930).
26. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 791-92 (1968); FPC v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944); Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 82, 88
(5th Cir. 1974).
27. Aschaffenburg v. United States, 381 F. Supp. 510, 513 (E.D. La. 1974).
28. Cf. Commissioner v. 0. Liquidating Corp., 292 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1961). This
case actually dealt with a Treasury Regulation. To understand the differences in
Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings see generally Rogovin, supra note 6. Admin-
istrative Rulings of the Treasury Department, which are consistent with the' statute and
have been consistently unchallenged, should not be overturned "except for very cogent
reasons." Farmers Cooperative Co. v. Birmingham, 86 F. Supp. 201, 229 (N.D. Iowa
1949).
29. One commentator has expressed the opinion that of these factors, the most
important may be judicial agreement or disagreement with the rule. DAVIS, supra note
21, § 5.05, at 317.
30. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968); Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602
(1944); Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 82, 85 (5th Cir. 1974).
31. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Kern v. Granquist, 291
F.2d 29, 31-32 (9th Cir. 1961). Although the court in Kern recognized a logical and
more equitable interpretation of the statute, the majority chose to defer to the weight of
the Treasury Regulation.
32. United States v. Eddy Bros., 291 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1961) (the Revenue
Ruling was held contrary to statute); Kern v. Granquist, 291 F.2d 29, 33 (9th Cir.
1961) (dissenting opinion); United States v. Bennett, 186 F.2d 407, 410-11 (5th Cir.
1951).
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Another factor used in determining the validity of the interpretative
rule is the implied congressional sanction of the rule through reenact-
ment of the statute under which the rule is promulgated. The sanction
is based on assumed legislative knowledge of how the agency is applying
that law.3" This incorporation of the rule into law does not, however,
apply against the agency. So that Congress will not have to change the
statute every time there is a correction to be made in interpretation, the
administrative agency must be allowed to ohange a rule through its
rulemaking powers regardless of congressional reenactment.
3 4
In the midst of this body of law dealing with the manner of review
of administrative rulings, there has developed a new method of deter-
mining whether or not a rule is subject to section 5:53 procedure.
Originating in the context of rulings alleged to be exempt as procedural,
this method was designed to satisfy the section 553 objectives of expos-
ing "proposed agency action. . . to the test of prior examination and
comment by the affected parties."35 Under this new approach the basis
for exemption from rulemaking proceedings is not the facile semantic
distinctions of the definitions of "procedural" and "interpretative," but
is instead the rule's importance to those regulated and to the public. To
determine if a rule is sufficiently important (has a substantial effect),
there are four considerations: (1) the complexity and pervasiveness of
the rules issued, (2) the degree of departure from former practices
resulting from the rule (termed by courts as "drastic changes affected"),
(3) the degree of retroactivity of the rule, and (4) the confusion and
controversy engendered by practical difficulties of compliance with the
new rule.3" This analysis does not look -to what the agency says it is
33. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 510 (1959); Commissioner v.
Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 469 (1946). On the other hand it has been said that this is a
fiction if the point sanctioned never occurred to Congress in the reenactment. Western
Union v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 508 (1945). Validity of Treasury Rulings through
reenactment has been considered a nullity as the statutes are no longer periodically
renewed. L. WRIGHT, COMPARATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCEDURES IN TAXATION
65 (1968); Popkin, A Critique of the Rule-Making Process in Federal Income Tax Law
with Special Reference to Conglomerate Acquisitions, 45 IND. L.J. 453, 511 (1970).
34. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. United States, 303 F.2d 928, 934 (Ct. Cl.
1962).
35. National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90, 96
(D.D.C. 1967) (Burger, C.J., then a circuit judge, joined in an opinion by McGowan,
J.), affd mem., 393 U.S. 18 (1968). See also Pharmaceuticals Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch,
307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970). In dealing with an FDA regulation, the court said
that the policy of section 553 mandated the availability of prior comment if the rule "has
a substantial impact on... the members or the products of that industry .... "Id. at
863.
36. American Bancorporation, Inc. v. Board of Governors of :Fed. Reserve Sys.,
1976] 425
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doing, but instead examines the actual effect of the rule. A "substantial
effect" on rights and obligations necessitating rulemaking procedures
has been found in regulations that nullified a student exemption from a
labor certificate required for immigrant status,37 established new
qualifications for parole,38 established an evidentiary standard that may
have stopped the marketing of thousands of drugs,3 9 and allowed air-
lines to use X-rays to guard against hijacking and thus created a health
risk for airlines' employees and travellers. 40 Although prior notice and
hearing was essential in the adoption of these rules, such procedures are
unnecessary if the due process standards are satisfied in another pro-
ceeding. American Bancorporation, Inc. v. Board of Governors of
Federal Reserve System41 illustrates two possible manners in which
another proceeding may substitute.
At issue in American Banco was a rule promulgated by the Federal
Reserve Board to substantially expand permissible banking activities.
Although it had serious public and business implications and was issued
without prior notice and hearing, an attempt to invalidate the rule failed.
The rule was a narrower version of another rule that had been recently
adopted after notice and hearing; at that hearing the agency -had heard
discussion of the banking activities permitted by the new rule. 2 A
second basis for allowing the exclusion of section 553 proceedings was
found in the passive status of the rule. Before a bank could enter the
activities allowed by the rule, it had to obtain Federal Reserve Board
approval preceded by a hearing with public participation.4" Despite the
absence of rulemaking procedures the agency was educated before the
rule became effective.44 Participation at some stage by those affected is
clearly critical. If affected parties cannot participate, there is serious
danger that the administrative agency will view the rule in light of its
509 F.2d 29, 33 (8th Cir. 1974); Continental Oil Co. v. Bums, 317 F. Supp. 194, 197
(D. Del. 1970).
37. Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 337 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
38. Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
39. Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970).
40. Nader v. Butterfield, 373 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1974).
41. 509 F.2d 29 (8th Cir. 1974).
42. This first hearing was held one year before the latter rule was adopted. The
hearing considered allowing bank holding companies to participate in multiple activities.
The former rule adopted a general policy statement which was limited by the contested
rule to five specific activities. Id. at 33-34.
43. The fact that a later hearing may be had does not, however, protect parties
where an administrative ruling creates legal consequences in advance of hearings. See
CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 417-20 (1942).
44. 509 F.2d at 35.
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narrow purpose and ignore the broader implications of the action. 45
Such implications were admittedly ignored by the IRS in promulgating
the rule that was the subject of litigation in Gibson Wine Co. v.
Snyder."
Pursuant to the Federal Alcohol Administrative Act -the IRS issued
a ruling requiring that wine made from the boysenberry variety of
blackberry be labelled as boysenberry wine. Challenged in Gibson
Wine, the rule was found to be exempt from notice and hearing require-
ments. In basing its holding on the legislative-interpretative distinction,
the court noted that although it was necessary to inform the consumer,
this rule could be working an injustice. The boysenberry was only one
of several varieties of blackberry, all of which had a different flavor. By
creating a name foreign to the consumer, this rule would cause the
producers of boysenberry wine to maintain a more than modest expense
to develop a new market. To satisfy the consumer and protect the
business interests, the court, after hearing from all parties to the dispute,
recommended a possible judicious alternative label of "Blackberry Wine
of the Boysenberry Variety. 47  Subsequent IRS adoption of the judi-
cially proposed alternative indicates that better administrative action
results from participation by affected parties.
4"
If regulations merely adopting a definition of "a type of grape '' 49
could be found to create inequities justifying modification, a de novo
hearing in Eastern Kentucky may have 'similarly produced influential
evidence. 50  Holding that Revenue Ruling 69-545 was interpretative
and not subject to rulemaking procedures, the majority in Eastern
Kentucky noted that the ruling -had "no independent binding effect and
that the courts . .. [may or may not] choose to accept it as proper."51
Although the majority recognized that they were free to insert their
judgment as to the wisdom of the rule before accepting its reasoning, the
dissent claimed that there was not a proper hearing to determine the
45. See generally text accompanying and cases cited notes 35-39 supra.
46. 194 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
47. Id. at 336. The consumer would know the fruit of his wine, and the
boysenberry wine producers do not bear an additional expense for the promotion of their
product.
48. See Note, Power of Administrative Agencies to Change Interpretative Rules, 1
J. PUB. LAw 491, 497 (1952).
49. This was the phrase used by Judge Bazelon in distinguishing rules held
interpretative from Revenue Ruling 69-545. Ironically he found definitions of "a type of
grape" in Gibson Wine to be justifiably interpretative on the basis of its insignificance.
506 F.2d at 1292 n.1 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
50. See id. at 1292-93.
51. Id. at 1290.
1976] 427
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ruling's merits.52 The court considered all the elements suggested to be
used in reviewing a nonauthoritative ruling with the possible exception
of "all factors giving (the rule) power to persuade."5 3  While the
dismissal of the alleged lack of consideration of the needs of the poor
was based on the elements of Ruling 69-545 assumed to benefit the
poor,54 use of these superficial assumptions as representative of "all
persuading factors" omits consideration of authorities and data that
might prove these assumptions incorrect.5 5 The IRS in Eastern Ken-
tucky, as in Gibson Wine, had issued the ruling in the shelter of their
bureaucracy. Unlike Gibson Wine, however, the lack of participation
by the affected parties at the administrative level was not corrected at
the judicial level. Although the alleged injustice to the indigent may
not exist or may conflict with more important aims of the Revenue
Ruling, these issues are indeterminable until the scope of the alleged
adverse effect is defined.
The conclusion that affected parties should be heard does not
necessarily negate the possibility that due process considerations were
not satisfied at a prior proceeding. In holding the ruling to be interpre-
tative, the majority in Eastern Kentucky found support in Treasury
Regulations adopted in 1959 after notice and hearing. Ten years after
adoption of the regulations, Ruling 69-545 conformed the definition of
"charitable hospital" to the concept of "charitable" adopted by the
earlier Regulation.56 Although a public hearing for a prior rule was
justification for holding a rule to be interpretative in American Banco,
the previous hearing had included consideration of the activities accept-
ed three years later in the contested rule.57 The hearings for the 1959
52. Id. at 1292-93.
53. See generally text accompanying note 24 supra. The court examined the rule's
consideration, its reasoning, and its consistency with other pronouncements in upholding
the legislative validity. 506 F.2d at 1286-90.
54. This assumption was based on the fact that the Revenue Ruling had allowed
exemption for a hospital which gave emergency service for indigents and accepted
patients with third party payment plans. The court further felt that "Ruling 69-545 may
be of greater benefit to the poor than its predecessor Ruling 56-185." 506 F.2d at 1289.
Part of this belief that the rule benefitted the poor was based on the majority's opinion
that Ruling 56-185 permitted a hospital operating at a deficit to qualify for charitable
exemption with no obligations to the poor. Id. at 1289 n.26. However, this selective
quote by the court omits the qualification that the hospital "must not, however, refuse to
accept patients in need of hospital care who cannot pay for such services." Rev. Rul.
185, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 202,203.
55. Cf. Comment, Provision of Free Medical Services by Hill-Burton Hospitals, 8
HAgv. Civ. Rirn-s-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 351 (1973).
56. 506 F.2d at 1290.
57. 509 F.2d at 33-34. The former ruling had authorized a broad scope of banking
activities, and in making the new ruling, the Board had narrowed the former ruling to
[Vol. 54
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Treasury Regulation in Eastern Kentucky apparently did not weigh the
implications of "charitable" as applied to hospitals.5 8 This fact in
combination with the time span between the hearings and adoption of
the Revenue Ruling indicate that it was not truly subject to examination
by affected parties.59
The conclusion that a conflict may be competently resolved only
after a hearing does not, however, lead automatically to the further
conclusion that the hearing should have been in the administrative body,
as the dissenters claim,6 0 rather than in the courts.6 ' The finding that
the ruling was interpretative, which allows public input to occur in the
courts, is supported by strong precedent. By using the origin of the
agency's rulemaking power to determine the rule's authoritative status
(and thus the necessity for hearings prior to promulgation), Revenue
Rulings are clearly interpretative.62 But even if the applicability of
rulemaking procedure was determined by the substantial effect test,63
the Revenue Ruling might be interpretative. The question would be
whether the rule has a substantial effect through the new rights and
obligations it creates. Of the considerations suggested for this determi-
nation, only the drastic changes affected are at issue.64 In support of
the majority it can be argued that the ruling will not actually cause
indigents to be turned away from hospitals in great numbers, and the
reverse presumption supports the dissent of Judge Wright. The fact
that the new ruling merely clarified the Treasury Regulation implies a
allow only five explicit activities. Under either rule the activities in question were
permissible.
58. 506 F.2d at 1286-90.
59. Compare the effect of Revenue Ruling 69-545 on Revenue Ruling 56-185, notes
7, 9 supra, with the effect of the amended regulation in American Banco, note 57 supra.
60. 501 F.2d at 1291-93.
61. Submissions by interested parties on all rules promulgated by an administrative
agency might be justified on the basis of the relatively efficient procedures of the
administrative body in comparison to those of the courts. In the interest of due process
considerations, such submissions have been proposed in the issuance of Revenue Rulings.
Where the submissions justify modifications there would be elimination of otherwise
needed judicial review. Where the IRS feels suggested modifications inappropriate,
judicial review should be discouraged by the likelihood of failure of a second challenge
on the basis of the same contention. See generally L. WRIGHT, NEEDED CHANGES IN
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 67-68 (1970).
62. See, e.g., Macey's Jewelry Corp. v. United States, 387 F.2d 70, 72 (5th Cir.
1967). But cf. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7805; DAvis, supra note 21, § 5.03, at 300.
63. 506F.2dat1291.
64. See text accompanying note 36 supra. The other considerations may be
summarily dismissed. The rules are on their face not complex and generally have no
retroactive effect. See note 70 infra. Compliance with the ruling would not involve any
difficulties as it increases eligibility for charitable exemptions and adds no new require-
ments.
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less drastic change. 65 On the other hand the revocation of the old
ruling and the long-standing administrative precedent seems severe.
While the action of the administrative agency in Eastern Kentucky
was arguably justifiable, the negative aspects of the legislative-interpre-
tative distinction have been illuminated above. 66 Although the primary
purpose of section 553 is the provision of an opportunity for affected
parties to voice concerns, thus contributing to the education of the
agency promulgating rules of significant consequence,6 7 courts generally
ignore this purpose and instead base the distinction on the existence of
statutory authority.68 This nearly exclusive emphasis upon the exist-
ence of statutory authority frequently leads to judicial failure to examine
the irreversible impact exerted by the rule before judicial review. For
example, Revenue Rulings, which are generally found to have no ex-
press statutory authority, 69 are given prospective effect by the IRS. Until
the ruling is judicially, administratively, or legislatively reversed, this
prospedtive effect guarantees IRS agents and taxpayers that meeting the
standard set by the rule is sufficient.70 Although courts are allowed to
treat the rulings as nonbinding, IRS policy has -had a permanent impact
in the intermediate period. Basing exemptions on statutory authority
has the additional problem of judicial confusion. Examination of the
cases illustrates ambiguities in both the understanding of what consti-
tutes statutory authority71 and the type of review warranted. 72  When
the issues examined by the court fail to focus on the purposes of the act,
the natural result is confusion.
The substantial effect rule apparently concentrates on the underly-
ing policy of section 553. All of the factors to be considered look to the
application of the rule; the need for notice and hearing is based on the
importance of that application. The question is "Does the rule have a
substantial impact?" Although there is the danger of semantical feint-
65. But cf. text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
66. See text accompanying notes 49-55 supra.
67. See cases cited notes 35-40 supra.
68. See cases cited notes 20-21 supra.
69. See DAvIs, supra note 21, § 5.03, at 300.
70. "Taxpayers generally may rely upon Revenue Rulings . . . in determining the
tax treatment of their own transactions . . . ." Rev. Proc. 1, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 386.
Although there is a power to revoke a Revenue Ruling retroactively, the Commissioner
has limited this power to allow the taxpayer to rely on the Commissioner's position
represented by the ruling. Rogovin, supra note 6, at 768-69. By encouraging modifica-
tion of taxpayer behavior to follow the Revenue Ruling, the agency has created an
impact on those parties affected by the modified behavior.
71. See DAvis, supra note 21, § 5.03, at 300.
72. See cases cited notes 25-28 supra.
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ing with this phrase,73 the courts seem impressed that they are weighing
the factors to determine the need for prior notice and hearing.
74 If
public participation is allowed in another proceeding, due process stan-
dards may be satisfied. If not, the factors weighed attempt to illuminate
the significance of the administrative action. 75  Although there will be
disagreements over the delineation of appropriate factors and the deter-
mination of their relative influence, the purpose of section 553 is more
likley to be realized by "substantial effect" analysis than by the legisla-
tive-interpretative distinction applied in Eastern Kentucky.
WILLIAM D. DANNELLY
Constitutional Law-Mortmain Statutes-A Blow to an Old
and Ailing Statute
Mortmain statutes,' which restrict2 charitable bequests in wills3
executed within a specified period4 before the testator's death, were
incorporated from the Georgian Statute of Mortmain5 into the constitu-
73. "Substantial impact," like "interpretative rule," could be analyzed in terms of its
meaning rather than its underlying purpose of ferreting out the need for notice and
hearing prior to the rule's promulgation.
74. See cases cited notes 35-41 supra.
75. See text accompanying note 36 supra. While the coordination of these con-
siderations is complex, each illuminates a factor of importance. A complex and per-
vasive rule indicates a greater likelihood of agency error that might be discovered
through public participation. Drastic changes, retroactivity, and difficulty in com-
pliance with the rule all indicate that there are persons with a direct interest in the rule.
That there are those injured is probably indicative of the rule's importance.
1. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2507(1) (Spec. Pamphlet 1975) states, in
relevant part: "Any bequest or devise for religious or charitable purposes included in a
will or codicil executed within 30 days of the death of the testator shall be invalid to the
extent that someone who would benefit by its invalidity objects: Provided, That the
Commonwealth shall not have the right so to object .. "
2. Some statutes only limit the bequest, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 15-2-615 (Supp. 1972)
allows an unlimited bequest to charity provided the first $100,000 of the testators estate
goes to his lineal descendants.
3. Pennsylvania, for example, invalidates certain inter vivos transfers to charitable
organizations made within thirty days of death. Joslin, Legal Restrictions on Gifts to
Charities, 21 TENN. L. REV. 761,764 & n.19 (1951).
4. The prohibited period ranges from thirty days to one year before death. 1 W.
BoWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 3.16 (1960).
5. Also called the Charitable Uses Act. For a discussion of the history see W.
ROLLISON, VILLS §§ 168-70 (1970); Restrictions on Charitable Testamentary Gifts, 5
REAL PROPERTY, PROBAT & TRUST J. 290, 291 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Restrictions].
